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ABSTRACT. Programs that provide incentives to induce conservation are often ineffect-
ive, leading farmers to abandon conservation once assistance iswithdrawn.An alternative
to incentives is to offer conservation technologies in conjunction with measures that en-
hance the short-term proﬁtability of agriculture. Our results indicate that CARE, an inter-
national non-governmental organization, has used this approach successfully to promote
resource conservation in the Ecuadorian Andes. In particular, the adoption of terraces
was found to increase signiﬁcantly when accompanied by alterations to the agricultural
system, such as new crops, biological barriers, and improved agricultural production.
1. Resource conservation programs and developing countries
Recent evidence suggests that more than 40 per cent of the world’s
agricultural land is moderately to extremely degraded and that this
degradation has reduced crop productivity by 13 per cent (Wood et al.,
2001). Policy makers have reason to be concerned. The reduction in farm
productivity associated with degradation can affect: (1) aggregate supply
or price of agricultural output if degrading soils are a signiﬁcant source of
agricultural output; (2) agricultural income or economic growth if degradation
leads to lower production and reduced income; (3) consumption by poor farm
households if degrading soils are a critical source of food security for subsist-
ence producers; and (4) national wealth if degradation reduces productive
capacity (Scherr, 1999). Furthermore, the off-site effects of degradation on
developing economies can be substantial, possibly exceeding the on-site
effects, and are especially costly for hydroelectric projects (Southgate and
Macke, 1989). For example, the National Electrical Authority in Ecuador
considers erosion from current or abandoned agricultural lands as the
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principal source of sedimentation in the hydroelectric reservoirs, which
supply nearly 70 per cent of the electrical power supply in a country that
experiences chronic shortages (INECEL, 1992).
Concerns over the effects of degradation have increased interest among
policy makers in promoting conservation measures. A primary objective of
these conservation programs is to induce farmers tomanage their parcels in
a manner that limits the off-farm effects of degradation and that enhances
the long-term productivity of agricultural land. Advocates of conservation
programs argue that without external intervention farmers will not invest
in conservation or, at least, an insufﬁcient number of farmers will invest
at an optimal level. The basis of this argument is that the beneﬁts of
conservation do not accrue solely, or even primarily, to farmers (net social
beneﬁts exceed net private beneﬁts) and to reach a desirable social outcome
it is necessary to provide incentives for conservation activities. Further
rationales for external intervention include failures in the credit market and
the market for information. Since farm-level conservation measures often
require high immediate costs with the promise of long-term beneﬁts, the
presence of credit market imperfections and failure (particularly for long-
term credit) in rural areas of developing economies makes conservation
difﬁcult toundertake. In this context, failure to adopt conservationmeasures
does not mean farmers do not perceive beneﬁts to conservation, but are
credit constrained and cannot invest. Alternatively, because degradation is
a long-term problem and in some circumstances difﬁcult to assess given the
number of factors that contribute to the variability of agricultural output,
it may be the case that farmers simply do not know that degradation is
occurring. Even if farmers have adequate information on degradation, they
may have limited information on potential responses to the problem. The
lack of conservation may then be a result of poor information.
If farmers’ failure to adopt conservation measures is related to limited
information, interventions may focus on the provision of information
on degradation and on conservation measures. However, if there is a
divergence between the social and private optimal level of conservation
because of off-farm effects or if credit constraints limit adoption, some
form of assistance may be required to induce conservation. Assistance
may include credit provision for investing in conservation measures, and
various forms of subsidies, such as free inputs, payment for labor used
for conservation, or even direct construction of conservation structures.
The logic of these programs is that by reducing the short-term costs of
conservation, farmers will be induced to conserve for long-term and off-
site beneﬁts.
The problem with programs offering incentives is that the conservation
measures they promote are often not maintained. For example, in her
analysis of adoption and maintenance of the Plan Sierra conservation
program in the Dominican Republic, de la Briere (1996) notes that of the
190 program participants surveyed, 91 per cent adopted some conservation
practices while in the program. At the time of the survey, however, 27 per
cent of adopters had completely abandoned the conservation practices.
De la Briere shows that the termination of program subsidies led to
an immediate increase in abandonment of conservation practices. Some
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farmers therefore participate only to receive subsidies. In another study of
the Dominican Republic, Carrasco and Witter (1991) report a 90 per cent
adoption rate of conservation practices in the MARENA program while
subsidieswere still being offered. Five years after subsidies had ended, only
53 per cent of adopting farmers still maintained the practices. Obando and
Montalva´n (1994) note a similar phenomenon in the Lake Xolotlan region
of Nicaragua. In that region, conservation measures were constructed at
no cost to the farmers in order to limit ﬂooding in Managua. Many of
the structures were abandoned or destroyed because they interfered with
common agricultural practices.
Discerning the causes of the abandonment of conservation measures
requires understanding farmers’ decision making with respect to the
adoption of conservation technologies. As noted, it is often assumed
that the adoption of conservation measures does not occur because of
high short-term costs and distant future beneﬁts. The abandonment of
established conservation measures suggests that this is not the only reason
for farmers’ reluctance to adopt. Abandonment may be motivated by the
fact that maintenance costs of structures exceed the private beneﬁts of
conservation. Another more likely reason, noted in the Nicaragua case
above, is that conservation interferes with current agricultural practices
and lowers short-term agricultural output and proﬁt. For example, terraces
lower the surface area available for planting, and often make tractor and
oxen use more difﬁcult. This corresponds to the conclusions drawn by
Lipper (2001) that natural capital and manufactured capital are often
complements and changes in natural capital result in the decline of the
effectiveness of manufactured capital inputs. This is particularly a problem
when an outside expert, rather than the farmer, determines the location of
terraces. Government or NGO ofﬁcials may erect terraces where they will
best conserve soil and water, but not where they are most conducive to
agricultural production.
Conservation decisions thus become not solely a matter of comparing
the costs of conservation measures and the distant beneﬁts of reduced
degradation on productivity, but include the effects on current agricultural
production. Murray (1994) notes the interaction between conservation and
current production when he writes:
Enthusiasm for soil conservation is high only when the increments in
productivity likely to come from new land use practices rise above a
certain threshold. Soil conservation by itself rarely creates or sustains such
threshold level of increments. Rather, soil conservation is generally adopted in
conjunction with, and response to, other technological or economic shifts . . .
Farmers are more open to soil conservation measures when these measures are
not presented as the principal element in the project, but rather as secondary,
ancillary items in a menu featuring innovations with impressive short-term,
income generating potential.
Along similar lines, Barbier (1990) in his study of soil conservation in Java
notes that switching from a corn or cassava production system to higher
valued crops increased the returns to terracing and thus increased adoption
of terraces.
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These insights have important implications for the design of conservation
programs. Instead of providing subsidies or other incentives to induce
adoption of conservation measures, programs should be designed to
enhance the short-term proﬁtability of agriculture in a manner that
complements conservation. To evaluate whether this hypothesis holds true,
in this paper we evaluate a resource conservation program, PROMUSTA,1
that was implemented by the international non-governmental organization
CARE in the Ecuadorian Andes in the late 1980s and into the 1990s.
Along with promoting changes in resource management, PROMUSTA
encouraged farmers to adopt alternative agricultural activities and alter
practices. Incentives were limited to provision of seeds, plants, and inputs
and not direct payment for conservation. A menu of options was presented
to farmers to increase income generated from agriculture and improve
resource management. Plans were developed in conjunction with farmers
on a case-by-case basis. The objective of this paper is to evaluate the
success of PROMUSTA in inducing adoption of conservation measures. In
particular, we want to answer two questions. First, are farmers more likely
to adopt conservation measures, such as terraces, if they also alter their
agricultural practices? Second, was the PROMUSTA program successful
at improving the management of natural resources in the Andes? Data
collected from a household survey of 530 PROMUSTA participants and
non-participants in 44 communities in the Ecuadorian Andes are used to
answer these questions. Towards this end, the remainder of this paper
is divided into ﬁve sections. Section 2 provides a brief description of
CARE’s PROMUSTA program. Section 3 discusses the survey design
and provides an initial discussion of the data. In section 4, the success
of PROMUSTA in inducing terrace adoption on parcels operated by
smallholders is evaluated. Section 5 examines how PROMUSTA affected
resource management by examining the household-level intensity of
adoption of conservation practices. Section 6 provides a brief assessment
of the impact of PROMUSTA. Conclusions and policy implications are
discussed in section 7.
2. CARE’s PROMUSTA Program
PROMUSTA was initiated by CARE International in 1988 in conjunction
with the Ecuadorian Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock and state and
local government organizations. The formal objective of the project was the
promotion of better resource management by smallholders (minifundistas)
in the Ecuadorian sierra through the adoption and adaptation of sustainable
land use practices with the ultimate objective to improve the quality of life
for farmers in the short and long term (PROMUSTA, no date). The farmers
targeted by the project were smallholders who were generally producing
staple crops for home consumption. The particular staple crop varied by
region. For example, corn was the primary staple in Imbabura, barley in
Cotopaxi, and potatoes in Chimborazo. In all cases, productivity was low,
1 PROMUSTA is an acronym for Proyecto Manejo del Uso Sostenible de Tierras
Andinas, which translates as Project for the Sustainable Use of Andean Lands.
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market access was limited, and, because of the mountainous nature of the
Andes, resource degradation was a problem.
Although the project initially focused on promoting soil conservation,
as the project progressed and developed it adopted a broader approach
that integrated natural resource management with components for
strengthening institutions, training and extension, agricultural intensiﬁca-
tion, crop diversiﬁcation, pastures and livestock management, forestry and
agroforestry, and water management. The menu of technological options
developed by PROMUSTA offered diverse possibilities for farmers that
were designed to meet local conditions. The mode of operation and the
technological options of the PROMUSTA project offer valuable insights
to researchers and development professionals interested in that elusive
concept of ‘scaling up’ research results to achieve widespread impact.
While the project planned work in seven mountainous provinces of
the Ecuadorian Andes, work began slowly in each region. Therefore, not
all communities entered the PROMUSTA program at once and, at the
time of the survey, communities were in different phases of the project.
Administrative units were organized by region (North, Central, and South)
and by area and the initial phase of development in each area (phase 1)
included a pre-diagnostic study designed to obtain general information
about potential communities in each province. Once possible sites were
selected, communities were speciﬁcally selected based on the following
criteria:
1. interest by both men and women in the project;
2. limited migration (speciﬁcally, not greater than 60 per cent);
3. a community economy based on agriculture, forestry, and animal
husbandry;
4. a community located in an important watershed;
5. no other similar projects working in the community; and
6. superior community organization.
In total, 193 communities were working with PROMUSTA at the time of
the survey.
After the communities were identiﬁed in phase 1, a diagnosis of the
community and a planning of actions occurred in phase 2. In this phase,
PROMUSTA representatives and communitymembers discussed the needs
and interests of the community with respect to resource conservation,
established the responsibilities and contributions of PROMUSTA and the
community participants, and selected farmer-promoters to oversee project
activities. The third phase, training and execution, involved executing
the plan developed in phase 2 and training the farmers. Training was
done through ﬁeld days, workshops, group discussions, demonstration
plots, and trips to farmers’ ﬁelds in other communities. After initial
training and execution of the plan, the community entered a phase of
development deﬁned as consolidation and adoption (phase 4). During
this stage farmer-promoters and project participants engaged in active
participation and movement towards improved management of natural
resources, with extensive adoption of new technologies. Finally, once the
community reached a level of maturity, and had learned to continue
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planning and executing conservation without external assistance, the
community graduated from the project (phase 5). This decision was made
in consultation with community participants. Of course, these phases
represent the ideal stages of development for a community. In some
circumstances, communities lacked interest in continuing work or failed to
progress sufﬁciently. In those cases, PROMUSTA quit the community. The
frequency of community contact with PROMUSTA extension agents varied
by phase. Project extension agents received regular training to help them
cope with the wide variety of technologies they were supposed to support.
Although themenuof options offered to farmerswas community speciﬁc,
in general, thePROMUSTAprogrampromotedawide rangeof technologies
from which the farmers, in consultation with extension agents, could
choose.2 The promoted technologies can be grouped broadly into two
categories: resource conservation and alterations to the agricultural system.
Resource conservation technologies included both slow forming and bench
terraces as well as measures to improve water management, such as water
runoff channels, reservoirs, bunds, and planting along the contour. Alter-
ations to the agricultural system were more varied and included adoption
of new crops (e.g., vegetable plots, fruit trees, horticulture, cultivated pas-
tures), agroforestry, biological barriers along the borders of plots,3 improved
agricultural production through improved varieties, new rotations and bet-
ter management, and soil quality improvements through composting and
worm farming.4 Based on the technologies promoted within a community,
farmers could choose those that best suited the needs of the farm.
3. Survey design and data
The data used in this study were collected by the International Potato
Center (CIP), with the active participation of PROMUSTA staff. In selecting
communities for the survey, it was deemed important that the sample be
stratiﬁed in a manner such that the selected communities represented
important differences across the PROMUSTA project. The criteria for
selecting potential communities were exogenous – i.e., the criteria used
were not an outcome of participation such as the level of adoption – and
included locationwithin the region, phase inPROMUSTA,distance tourban
centers, altitude and soil quality. Based on these criteria, a set of potential
communities was identiﬁed and the survey communities were randomly
chosen from this set. Within each selected community, households were
randomly selected to be interviewed for the survey. In total, 530 households
in 44 communities were surveyed between June and September 1996.
While the survey included participants and non-participants within
each community, it did not include households in communities that did
2 A detailed description of the PROMUSTA program and the technologies available
to farmers can be found in Winters et al. (1998).
3 These included grasses and other plants that could be used to feed animals, such
as guinea pigs, which are an important source of food and income in the Andes.
4 Worm farming refers to the intensive cultivation of earthworms for the purpose of
transforming plant and animal waste into humus that is rich in microorganisms.
The California red earthworm (Eisenia foetida) was used.
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not participate in PROMUSTA. This represents a signiﬁcant weakness
in the data since PROMUSTA communities may be different from
non-PROMUSTA communities. Two important differences, noted in the
community selection criteria in section 2, are the low migration levels and
high levels of social capital in the PROMUSTA communities. The results
presented in this paper should be viewed with caution since they may only
be relevant for communities with ‘PROMUSTA-type’ characteristics and it
would be incorrect to assume that PROMUSTA would have similar effects
in communities without these characteristics. However, it is reasonable to
assume that communities with these characteristics and that are likely to
participate in this type of program would have similar results. The results
of the analysis are relevant for communities with limited migration and
signiﬁcant social capital.
The household survey included questions on household demographics,
assets, income sources, organizational afﬁliation, and the adoption of
conservationmeasures and new agricultural practices. Furthermore, as part
of the household survey the household management of natural resources
was assessed. The enumerator evaluated the resource management
practices of every parcel operated by each farmer and determined the land
area of that parcel that was managed in an appropriate manner based
on CARE’s criteria.5 Criteria included the use of conservation measures,
particularly bench or slow-forming terraces, in an appropriate manner. A
poorly managed parcel would receive a value at or near zero per cent and
a well-managed parcel at or near 100 per cent. Summing over all the land
operated by the household, and weighting it by the relative size of each
parcel, an intensity of adoption of resource management measures was
calculated for each surveyed household.
Recognizing the importance of community factors in adoption of the
PROMUSTA package of technologies, a community-level survey was also
conducted for each of the 44 communities in which a household survey
was conducted. The community-level information was gathered from the
extension agents working within the communities and from discussions
with key informants in each community.
Table 1 reports information on the 530 sampled households and
a comparison of participant and non-participant households. When
evaluating this type of program there is the potential for selectivity bias;
those who chose to participate in the PROMUSTA program may have been
more likely to adopt conservation packages even if the program had not
been implemented. The beneﬁts of the program should be measured by
the level of adoption that occurred beyond what would have occurred
if the program had not been implemented. Of course, we do not know
what would have happened if the program had not been implemented, so
separating the effects of the program and the self-selection of participants
can be difﬁcult. One way to determine selectivity bias is to see if there
5 Note that these data were not collected by the extension agent working in the
community. Instead, it was collected by a PROMUSTA employee who was familiar
with CARE’s criteria for resource management but not the farmers he or she was
evaluating.
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Table 1. Participant versus non-participant households
Total Participants Non-participants Test
Number of observations 530 413 117
% of total obs. 100.0% 77.9% 22.1%
Human capital Total household members 5.1 5.2 4.6 −2.76∗∗∗
Male labor/ha. 8.2 8.3 7.8 −0.26
Female labor/ha. 8.6 8.8 7.9 −0.44
Age of household head 42.7 42.9 41.8 −0.74
Years in agriculture (head) 28.1 27.7 29.5 1.28
Education level (household ave. years) 3.6 3.6 3.4 −0.73
Income source Months working off-farm (head) 4.0 3.9 4.6 1.45
Income from off-farm work (%) 32.4% 30.8% 38.1% 2.31∗∗
Natural capital Land owned (hectares) 1.0 1.1 0.9 −0.37
Land operated (hectares) 1.1 1.1 1.0 −0.40
Number of parcels 1.5 1.5 1.4 −2.39∗∗
Slope of steepest parcel†(%) 26.8 27.7 23.7 −2.05∗∗
Altitude of highest parcel (meters) 3,090 3,097 3,013 −0.88
Distance to furthest parcel (meters) 667 604 887 1.94∗
Fraction of land with non-black soil 0.53 0.55 0.48 −1.45
Physical capital Value of large animals owned (US$)‡ 1,548 1,615 1,309 −1.73∗
Social capital Organization afﬁliation (no.) 1.3 1.4 0.9 −6.84∗∗∗
Was/is director of organization (%) 51.6% 59.7% 23.1% 48.99∗∗∗
Indigenous (%) 62.0% 60.9% 65.8% 0.94
Community Years CARE in community 4.7 4.7 4.8 1.48
charactersitics Distance to city (population >50,000) 50.2 50.3 49.7 −0.16
Population density (households/ha) 0.67 0.65 0.73 0.83
Annual rainfall (cm/year) 63.2 63.2 63.1 −0.06
Notes: Test of difference between non-participant and participant household; t-stats and chi-squared as appropriate.
∗ signiﬁcant at 10%, ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5%, ∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1% level.
† Data on slope are missing for four households.
‡ = Includes cows, horses, mules, pigs, sheep, goats, and llamas. Data are missing for one household.
Environment and Development Economics 703
was any systematic difference between participating and non-participating
households. To do this, in table 1 we present tests of difference between
participant and non-participant households using t-tests for averages and
chi-squared tests for discrete variables and discuss signiﬁcant differences
that emerge between the participant and non-participant households.
The average household size is 5.1 members with members deﬁned as
anyone who lived in that household for at least six months of the year.
Household labor was deﬁned as including any household member over
the age of 14. We distinguished male and female labor, since each is often
used for different activities, and we divided labor by operated land area to
determine labor availability per unit of land. On average each household
had 8.2 male labor units per hectare and 8.6 female labor units per hectare.
The higher number of females can be explained by the permanentmigration
of male labor. Note that households with more members (4.6 versus 5.2)
were signiﬁcantly more likely to participate. This could be due to labor
availability but, although participating households tended to have more
male and female labor per hectare, this difference is not signiﬁcant. The
age of the head of the household, usually the eldest male, represents the life
cycle stage of the household and, alongwith years in agriculture, represents
the experience of the primary decision maker. The average household head
is 43 years old and average years in agriculture 28.1. Skill level within the
household is measured by average years of education and, on average,
household labor has 3.6 years of education.
One-third of household income came from off-farm sources as seen in
the percentage of reported off-farm income (32.4 per cent) and the average
months per year the head of household works off-farm (4 months). This
suggests that for extensive periods of the year, much of household labor is
not available for farm work. Not surprisingly, farmers with more off-farm
income (38.1 per cent versus 30.8 per cent) tended not to participate in
PROMUSTA probably due to time limitations. Farmers on average owned
only 1.0 hectare of land and operated slightly more (1.1 hectares) through
rental, loan or sharecropping contracts. Seven per cent of farmers surveyed
owned no land and 79 per cent owned one hectare or less. Only 5 per cent of
farmers owned four ormore hectares. Farmers in the sample did not operate
many parcels; the average number was 1.5. Sixty-two per cent of farmers
worked only one parcel, 27 per cent worked two parcels and the remainder
(11 per cent) worked on three to six parcels. The parcels farmers operated
can be categorized by slope, altitude, distance from the house, and whether
the soil was black or not. There was signiﬁcant variation in these parcel
characteristics with slope varying from 0 to 89 per cent, altitude from 2,000
to 4,500meters, distance from the house from 0 to 10,000meters and fraction
of non-black soils from 0 to 1. Livestock, particularly large livestock (cows,
horses, mules, pigs, sheep, goats, and llamas), can be a source of savings
and production for the household. Using prices from a provincial fair in
October 1997, we approximated the value of large livestock owned. On
average the value of a farmer’s livestock is US$1,545, however, nearly half
of farmers own less than US$1,000 worth of livestock. Comparing natural
and physical capital, participants tended to have slightly more parcels
than non-participants (1.5 versus 1.4), steeper parcels (27.7 per cent versus
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23.7 per cent), less distant parcels (604 versus 887) andmore livestock assets
($1,611 versus $1,309).
Social capital can facilitate information and improve participation.
Farmers were members in 1.3 organizations on average and 51.6 per cent
of farmers noted they were at one time a director of an organization.6
Participants were more likely than non-participants to be members of
multiple organizations (1.4 versus 0.9) and to have been a director of an
organization (59.7 per cent versus 23.1 per cent). This degree of activism
was to be expected given PROMUSTA’s community selection criteria based
on superior community organization. Sixty-two per cent of households
report being indigenous. CARE has worked in the surveyed communities
for 4.7 years on average with some communities initiating work 11 years
prior to the survey and others the year before the surveyed. A plurality of
households (25 per cent) started working with CARE three years before the
survey. Distance to an urban center of over 50,000 inhabitants varies from 4
to 155 kilometerswith the average being 50km.Access tomajormarketswill
also vary with this distance. Population density, deﬁned as the number of
households per hectare of land in the community, also varied substantially,
froma rather disperse 0.03 households per hectare of land in the community
to ﬁve households per hectare of land. Only two communities (4.5 per cent)
had more than two households per hectare and only eight communities
(18.2 per cent) had more than one household per hectare. Average annual
rainfall was 63 cm,with the driest community receiving 28 cm/year and the
wettest 120 cm/year. Approximately one-third of the communities received
50 cm/year or less of rainfall, one-third between 50 and 75 cm/year, and
one-third over 75 cm/year.
While these numbers do indicate some differences between participants
and non-participants, a better method of examining participation is the use
of a probit regression on participation which estimates the probability of
a household participating in the PROMUSTA program given exogenous
household characteristics. Table 2 reports these results with the marginal
effects (at the samplemean) onparticipation reported instead of coefﬁcients.
Results indicate that the age and agricultural experience of the household
head inﬂuenced participation in the project. While older farmers tended to
bemore likely to participate this effect diminishedwith age.However, years
of agricultural experience, controlling for age, is negatively associated with
participation. This suggests that, independent of age, farmerswith less years
of agricultural experience were more likely to participate in the program.
While farmers with more land were less likely to participate, farmers
with more parcels were more likely to participate with each additional
parcel increasing the probability of participation by 5.6 per cent. Not
surprisingly, farmers with steeper parcels were more likely to participate
in the PROMUSTA program; speciﬁcally, for the average farmer, a 10 per
cent increase in slope led to a 2.6 per cent increase in the probability of
participation. The distance of the household’s furthest parcel decreases
6 The termorganization refers to permanent afﬁliations such as farmers’ associations,
productions groups, and federations of indigenous people. As a temporary
program, PROMUSTA is not considered an organization.
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Table 2. Probit on PROMUSTA participation (Number of households= 525)
Marginal
effect z-stat
Human capital Male labor/ha. 0.0007 0.30
Female labor/ha. 0.0023 1.52
Age of household head 0.0184 2.50∗∗
Age of household head squared −0.0001 −2.08∗
Years in agriculture (head) −0.0061 −2.60∗∗∗
Education level (household ave. years) −0.0091 −0.98
Income source Received income from off-farm work† −0.0531 −1.50
Natural capital Land owned (hectares) −0.0080 −1.87∗
Number of parcels 0.0562 1.73∗
Slope of steepest parcel (%) 0.0026 3.06∗∗∗
Altitude of highest parcel (meters) −0.0001 −0.92
Distance to furthest parcel (meters) 0.0000 −2.21∗∗
Fraction of land with non-black soil 0.0939 1.79∗
Physical capital Value of large animals owned (US$) 0.0000 1.08
Social capital Organization afﬁliation (no.) 0.1753 4.65∗∗∗
Was/is director of organization† 0.1845 5.74∗∗∗
Indigenous† −0.1172 −2.89∗∗∗
Community Years CARE in community 0.0038 0.96
charactersitics Distance to city (population >50,000) 0.0012 2.19∗∗
Population density (households/ha) −0.0207 −2.41∗∗
Annual rainfall (cm/year) −0.0003 −0.35
Provincial Azuay 0.1298 3.85∗∗∗
dummies‡ Canar 0.0165 0.39
Chimborazo 0.0243 0.61
Cotopaxi −0.1130 −2.00∗∗
Imbabura −0.0111 −0.19
Loja −0.0946 −1.25
Constant – −0.74
Notes: ∗ signiﬁcant at 10%, ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5%, ∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1% level.
Observation are assumed independent across communities but not within
communities; standard errors were adjusted accordingly.
† For dummy variables marginal effect is a discrete change from 0 to 1.
‡ Default province is Tunguragua.
Predicted Predicted
non-part. participant
Actual non-participant 41 75
Actual participant 24 385
Per cent correct 63.1% 83.7%
Total per cent correct 81.1%
participation, while the presence of non-black soils increases participation.
The results indicate that land ownership and the type of lands operated
have a signiﬁcant impact on participation. Given the resource conservation
message of PROMUSTA, this should not be surprising.
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The strongest results come from the social capital variables.
Organizational membership is shown to have increased the probability
of participation by nearly 18 per cent while present or past directorship of
an organization increased participation by the average farmer by 18 per
cent. Being an indigenous household reduced participation by 9 per
cent. These results indicate that a key difference between participants
and non-participants is that participants were interested and receptive to
organizations and were less likely to be indigenous. At the community
level, distance to an urban center, a proxy for market access, increased
participation suggesting those further away from the urban centers were
more likely to participate. Population density also affected participation
with a greater number of households per hectare reducing participation.
Finally, the province of Azuay had lower participation and the province of
Cotopaxi higher participation relative to the base province Tunguragua.
4. Inducing terrace adoption
In section 1, we noted that conservation programs in developing
countries have a mixed history of success. Programs using incentives to
induce conservation often resulted in abandonment when incentives were
withdrawn. The CARE-PROMUSTA model offered a technological menu
that included conservation measures and alterations to the agricultural
system that enhanced short-term proﬁtability rather than offering incen-
tives to reduce short-term costs of conservation. In this section, we examine
whether this package induced the adoption of conservationmeasures. Since
only PROMUSTA participants were offered this menu of options, it is only
their parcels that are evaluated. The results are therefore only relevant
for PROMUSTA-type smallholders; speciﬁcally, those with characteristics
noted in the previous section.
As noted in section 2, a number of conservationmeasureswere promoted
by PROMUSTA. However, terraces, both slow forming and bench terraces,
were a key part of the program and we focus on the adoption of these
measures. The question we want to answer is whether terraces are more
likely to be adopted if complementary alterations in the agricultural
production system occur; speciﬁcally, adoption of new crops, agroforestry,
biological barriers, and improved agricultural production. The assumption
is that, as with terraces, the adoption of these agricultural practices on a
particular parcel would only occur if they were perceived to be proﬁtable
by the households. As an initial examination of whether terrace adoption is
associated with altered agricultural practices, table 3 presents parcel level
adoption of each technology for PROMUSTA participants. In total, 45.6 per
cent of parcels operated by participant households had a terrace on them at
the time of the survey. Among those who altered their agricultural system,
53.1 per cent had adopted terraces. To understand the adoption of these
practices, we move to regression analysis.
Since PROMUSTA is offered as a package and the decision to adopt
terraces and agricultural alterations is expected to be simultaneous,
household decision making should be considered in a simultaneous
decision making framework. Furthermore, both technologies are expected
to be discrete decisions in that farmers choose to adopt the technology or
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Table 3. Adoption of terraces by PROMUSTA participants
Altered Did not alter
agricultural agricultural Total
system system parcels
Terrace adoption 147 134 281
53.1% 39.5% 45.6%
No terrace 130 205 335
adoption 46.9% 60.5% 54.4%
Total parcels 277 339 616
not to adopt. The adoption decision can then be modeled as follows
t∗ = β0 + β ′1X1 + β2a∗ + ε1, t = 1 if t∗ > 0, 0 otherwise (1)
a∗ = a0 + a ′1X2 + ε2, a = 1 if a∗ > 0, 0 otherwise (2)
E(ε1) = E(ε2) = 0,Var(ε1) = Var(ε2) = 1,Cov(ε1, ε2) = ρ
where
t∗ = unobservable difference between beneﬁts and costs of terracing,
t = observed adoption of terraces,
a∗ = unobservable difference between beneﬁts and costs of altering
agriculture,
a = observed alteration of agricultural practices,
X1 = set of exogenous factors inﬂuencing the terracing decision,
X2 = set of exogenous factors inﬂuencing the decision to alter
agriculture, and
ε1, ε2 = random disturbances associated respectively with terracing and
agricultural alterations.
Note that equation (1) includes a* as a dependent variable based on
the hypothesis that alterations in the agricultural system induce terrace
adoption. The expectation is then that β2 will be positive and signiﬁcant.
Given the simultaneity of the equation system and the discrete nature of the
dependent variables, a bivariate probit model is appropriate for estimating
the equation system. Since the second dependent variable, a*, enters into
equation (1) as a dependent variable, themodel is a recursive, simultaneous
equations model. This particular type of model is presented in Maddala
(1983, p. 123) and explained with an example from Burnett (1997) in Greene
(2000, p. 852). Although equation (1) includes an endogenous variable on
the right-hand side, namely a*, no special attention needs to be given to
this in formulating the log-likelihood function. The details of why this is
the case can be found in Maddala and Greene. Greene notes that the reason
simultaneity can be ignored in this model and not in the linear regression
model is because in this case the log-likelihood is being maximized, while
in the linear regression case certain samplemoments are beingmanipulated
that do not converge to the necessary population parameters in the presence
of simultaneity. The standard bivariate probit therefore is appropriate for
this model speciﬁcation and is sufﬁcient to address the endogeneity of a*.
Results for the bivariate probit are presented in table 4. Since our primary
interest is in terrace adoption, we begin with those results. The results
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Table 4. Bivariate probit on adoption (Number of parcels= 612)
Terrace adoption Altered agricultural system
Coefﬁcient z-stat Coefﬁcient z-stat
Complementary
action Altered agricultural system 1.1932 3.57∗∗∗
Parcel Parcel area 0.0120 0.66 −0.0196 −0.75
characteristics Slope (%) 0.0093 2.58∗∗
Altitude (meters) −0.0001 −0.26 0.0000 0.20
Parcel distance to household (meters) −0.0003 −4.05∗∗∗
Not black soil† −0.2280 −1.93∗ 0.0606 0.75
Rented land† −0.2470 −1.20 0.3513 1.54
Human capital Male labor/ha. 0.0119 2.45∗∗ 0.0012 0.28
Female labor/ha. −0.0116 −2.95∗∗∗ −0.0008 −0.20
Age of household head 0.0235 0.85 0.0128 0.54
Age of household head squared −0.0003 −0.96 −0.0001 −0.39
Years in agriculture (head) −0.0141 −2.88∗∗∗
Education level (household ave. years) 0.0362 1.26 −0.0001 0.00
Income source Received income from off-farm work† −0.0044 −0.03 0.2757 2.02∗∗
Physical capital Value of large animals owned (US$) 0.0000 −0.09 0.0000 −0.64
Community Years CARE in community 0.1286 4.22∗∗∗ −0.0003 −0.02
charactersitics Distance to city (population >50,000) −0.0037 −1.46 −0.0034 −1.80∗
Population density (households/ha) 0.2208 3.94∗∗∗ −0.0281 −0.74
Annual rainfall (cm/year) 0.0259 5.49∗∗∗ 0.0006 0.20
Provincial Azuay −0.2097 −0.71 0.6875 4.70∗∗∗
dummies‡ Canar −1.9848 −7.49∗∗∗ 0.8091 3.75∗∗∗
Chimborazo −0.4153 −2.12∗∗ 0.5633 4.56∗∗∗
Cotopaxi 0.3656 1.14 0.5063 2.51∗∗
Imbabura −1.0979 −4.27∗∗∗ 0.5439 3.55∗∗∗
Loja −1.5840 −5.68∗∗∗ 0.6212 3.13∗∗∗
Constant −2.7638 −2.44∗∗ −0.6067 −0.82
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Table 4. continued
Notes: rho =−0.4857, Wald test of rho = 0 chi2(1) = 2.67 =⇒ Prob > chi2 = 0.10
∗ signiﬁcant at 10%, ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5%, ∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1% level.
Observation are assumed independent across communities but not within communities; standard errors were adjusted accordingly.
† Dummy variables
‡ Default province is Tunguragua.
Predicted Predicted Predicted not Predicted
non-adoption adoption altered altered
Actual non-altered/adoption 233 101 245 91
Actual altered/adoption 112 166 130 146
Per cent correct 67.5% 62.2% 65.3% 61.6%
Total per cent correct 65.2% 63.9%
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strongly indicate that alterations in the agricultural system had a signiﬁcant
and positive affect on the adoption of terraces. Thus, the hypothesis that
complementary alterations in the agricultural system induce conservation
appears to hold true. Not surprisingly, higher sloped land, where erosion
is expected to be greatest was positively associated with terrace adoption.
The presence of non-black soils was negatively associated with adoption.
Since non-black soils are considered less fertile than black soils, the result
indicates that conservation ismore likely onparcelswith fertile soil. Because
of the high labor requirements of erecting terraces it was expected that labor
availability, particularly of male labor would inﬂuence adoption. Farmers
noted in informal conversations that terracing was ‘work for men’. The
results support this view with adoption positively associated with male
labor availability and negatively with female labor availability.
At the community level, the time the community had been with CARE
was positively associated with terrace adoption. This suggests that terrace
adoption in a community increases with each year. This could be due to
two reasons. One is that the labor requirements make households delay
action until labor is available for putting in terraces. That is, households
wait to invest in terraces until the off-season or another period when
economic conditions lead to surplus household labor. Another reason is that
some households delay adoption until they have better information on the
beneﬁts of adoption and adoption follows the familiar ‘S-shaped’ pattern
with a few early adopters followed by ‘followers’ and then ‘laggards’
(Rogers, 1962). This process is partially encouraged by PROMUSTA in
that they select farmer-promoters to initially undertake actions in the
community facilitating the ﬂow of information in the community; a
process referred to in the literature as ‘learning from others’ (Foster and
Rosenzweig, 1995). The results suggest that over time more terraces would
have been adopted. While population density had a negative inﬂuence on
participation in PROMUSTA, it had a positive effect on terrace adoption
by participants. Greater population density suggests greater land scarcity,
which may encourage careful land management. This result runs contrary
to the view that higher population density will necessarily increase erosion.
Higher rainfall, which can lead to erosion but is also associated with higher
production possibility, was positively associated with terrace adoption.
Finally, adoption of terraces appears to have varied across province with a
number of provinces having a signiﬁcantly lower probability of adoption
than the base province Tunguragua. This result largely reﬂects the fact that
soil degradation is a particular problem in Tunguragua and, because of this,
a greater emphasis was placed on terraces in this province as a mechanism
to improve soil fertility and water retention.
The effects noted thus far are thedirect effects of household characteristics
on terrace adoption. Since altering agricultural production is shown to
inﬂuence the adoption of terraces, household characteristics also have an
indirect effect on terrace adoption through their inﬂuence on alteration
of agricultural practices. The results from the estimation of equation (2)
suggest that the distance of the parcel from the household inﬂuences
agricultural practices. Many of the practices promoted by PROMUSTA
required additional effort, investment, and monitoring by households.
Environment and Development Economics 711
The costs of these activities are likely to increase with the distance from
the household. Somewhat surprisingly, experience in agriculture was
negatively associated with adopting new agricultural practices (controlling
for age). This suggests that individuals that are newer to farming may
be more willing to take risks and explore alternative farming systems
while those with more experience may be fairly set in their practices.
Also somewhat surprising is the positive relationship between off-farm
income and alteration of agricultural practices. This could be indicative of
a complementary between off-farm income and altering the agricultural
system. Off-farm income may be used as a source of ﬁnance for investing
in agriculture or may be a mechanism to manage risk in the event the new
practices fail. Access to off-farm income then allows for the investment in
new practices. Alternatively, it may be the case that those who seek off-
farm work are also the type of person that would want to try to diversify
agriculture. A ﬁnal possibility is that off-farmwork is usually available near
urban centers and suggests market access. This ﬁnal hypothesis also comes
through in the distance to urban center variable. The negative association
between distance to urban center and changing the agricultural system
suggests that more remote households may not be willing or able to alter
practices and, in particular, move to new crops because they have limited
market access. This indirect effect of market access on terrace adoption
has important policy implications for conservation programs. To induce
conservation may require making the agricultural system more proﬁtable
in the short-term. However, developing proﬁtable ventures requires good
market access. This type of conservation program may therefore work
better in areas near urban centers. Finally, all regions were found to
have different adoption rates than the province of Tunguragua. Provinces
roughly correspond to the administrativeunits of thePROMUSTAprogram.
Differences could be due to differences in emphasis across provinces or
uncontrolled differences in agro-ecological or socio-economic factors. One
reason for this result, as noted in the discussion of terrace adoption, is that
Tunguragua has particular problems with soil quality which make it more
likely to adopt terraces but less likely to alter agricultural practices because
of the lower agricultural potential.
5. Household’s intensity of adoption
The results thus far show that the adoption of conservation measures was
positively associated with alterations of the agricultural system. The next
step to consider is whether this methodology used by PROMUSTA was
successful in promoting conservation in the communities in which they
worked. To examine this question, we used the data collected on the intens-
ity of adoption of resource conservation measures. Recall from section 2
that data on the percentage of land area ‘properly managed’ (based on
CARE criteria) was calculated for each farmer, including both participants
and non-participants. A farmer who managed none of the land in a manner
deemed acceptablewould have an adoption level of 0 per cent; while a fully
adopting farmer would have an adoption level of 100 per cent with most
farmers somewhere in between. The data are thus censored at 0 per cent and
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Table 5. Intensity of adoption
Level of adoption Total Participants Non-participants
0% 25.7% 10.3% 80.2%
1–10% 6.7% 7.3% 4.3%
11–20% 9.3% 10.5% 5.2%
21–30% 7.8% 9.1% 3.5%
31–40% 5.7% 7.1% 0.9%
41–50% 7.8% 10.0% 0.0%
51–60% 7.4% 8.8% 2.6%
61–70% 7.1% 8.8% 0.9%
71–80% 7.2% 8.8% 1.7%
81–90% 4.0% 4.9% 0.9%
91–100% 11.2% 14.4% 0.0%
100 per cent. Table 5 presents a breakdown of the intensity of adoption for
the sample as a whole and by participation. Of the 525 households included
in the analysis, 26 per cent did not adopt any new practices and thus had an
intensity of adoption of 0 per cent. Eleven per cent adopted the appropriate
technologies on all or nearly all their land and the remaining 64 per cent
were somewhere in between (with a nearly uniform distribution). Of those
with an intermediate level of adoption, the average percentage of adoption
was 46 per cent. Only 10 per cent of participant household had not adopted
any conservation practices compared with 80 per cent of non-participant
households, suggesting a strong program effect.
While the program appears to have had a signiﬁcant effect on the
resource management of PROMUSTA participants, there remains signi-
ﬁcant variability in the intensity of adoption. One possible explanation is
that farmers are still in the process of adopting the package and it is simply a
matter of time before full adoption occurs. Alternatively, other factors may
limit or enhance adoption. To carefully analyze the effect of PROMUSTA
on adoption and to understand the variability of adoption rates we again
employ regression analysis. In particular, we are interested in examining
the following relationship
i = φ0 + φ′1X3 + φ′2 p + ε3, 0 ≤ i ≤ 100 (3)
E(ε3) = 0,Var(ε3) = 1
where
i = intensity of adoption,
X3 = set of exogenous factors inﬂuencing the intensity of adoption,
p = 1 if PROMUSTA participant, 0 otherwise, and
ε3 = random disturbances associated with the intensity of adoption.
Since the dependent variable, i, is censored on both sides of the distri-
bution (0 per cent and 100 per cent), a double-censored regression model
is appropriate. However, there is an additional problem of the endogeneity
of PROMUSTA. As speciﬁed, PROMUSTA enters the equation as a dummy
variable that presumably measures the inﬂuence of participation on the
intensity of adoption. The problem with this speciﬁcation is that, as noted
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in section 3, it may be the case that PROMUSTA participants would
have adopted some conservation measures even if PROMUSTA had not
intervened. The coefﬁcient on the dummy variable may not measure
the effects of PROMUSTA, but reﬂect the characteristics of the types of
households that are likely to join PROMUSTA.
TheHausman test of endogeneity rejects thehypotheses thatPROMUSTA
is exogenous and thus the coefﬁcient in the double-censored regression
model would be biased (see Hausman, 1978, 1983). To deal with the
endogeneity of PROMUSTA, an instrumental variable approach is used
in which the predicted value of PROMUSTA participation is included
in the intensity of adoption equation (with standard errors adjusted as
appropriate). This is a common approach in the evaluation literature
with this type of cross-sectional data to evaluate the effects of program
participation on an outcome when participation is endogenous (see
Ravallion, 1999). A key to this approach is to ﬁnd appropriate instruments
that are correlated with participation but not with the error term in the
intensity of adoption equation. We use the social capital variables as
instruments arguing that these inﬂuence participation, but not the adoption
of natural resource management practices.
There are two potential complications with this approach. The ﬁrst is the
fact that participation in PROMUSTA is a discrete variable. To deal with
this, we specify participation as in table 2 but use a linear probability model
rather than a probit.7 Results from the linear probabilitymodel are the same
as for the probit (table 2) with the exception of the loss of signiﬁcance for
owned land and distance to urban center. The second issue is the double
censoring of the dependent variable in equation (3), which complicates the
instrumental variable regression. For this, we use Amemiya Generalized
Least Squares (AGLS) estimators as speciﬁed byNewey (1987)which allows
the estimation of censored regressions with endogenous variable.8 This
allows us to instrument participation in PROMUSTA while maintaining
the double-censored nature of the regression.
In table 6, the results for thedouble-censoredmodel using the actual value
of participation and for the double-censored model using the instrumental
variable approach are reported. As can be seen, the results are fairly
robust, although the model without instruments appears to underestimate
the effect of PROMUSTA. The results clearly indicate the strong effect of
PROMUSTA on the intensity of adoption especially when controlling for
endogeneity.Without PROMUSTA the intensity of adoption of conservation
measures would have been substantially lower.
The results also indicate that the amount of male labor per hectare
positively and signiﬁcantly affected the intensity of adoption, while female
labor negatively impacted the intensity of adoption, although this is not
signiﬁcant for the instrumental variable regression. This suggests that
7 Angrist (2000) suggests this approach for limited dependent variable models and
argues that it is consistent and that this approach is safer since predicting using a
probit is only consistent if the model is exactly correct.
8 The estimation is done using STATA based on a program written by Harkin (2001)
that uses the formulae developed by Newey (1987).
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Table 6. Regressions on intensity of adoption (Number of households = 525)
Double-censored Double-censored instrumental
regression variable regression
Coefﬁcient z-stat Coefﬁcient z-stat
Participation in CARE PROMUSTA 84.675 14.39∗∗∗ 104.414 8.61∗∗∗
Human capital Male labor/ha. 0.330 1.94∗ 0.314 1.84∗
Female labor/ha. −0.292 −1.86∗ −0.322 −2.04∗∗
Age of household head −0.041 −0.05 −0.577 −0.69
Age of household head squared −0.002 −0.31 0.002 0.26
Years in agriculture (head) 0.013 0.07 0.129 0.65
Education level (household ave. years) 2.384 2.32∗∗ 2.324 2.27∗∗
Income source Received income from off-farm work† −2.901 −0.73 −1.629 −0.40
Natural capital Land owned (hectares) −0.758 −1.17 −0.721 −1.11
Number of parcels −6.602 −2.45∗∗ −8.339 −2.94∗∗∗
Slope of steepest parcel (%) 0.075 0.71 0.041 0.39
Altitude of highest parcel (meters) 0.008 0.93 0.009 1.04
Distance to furthest parcel (meters) 0.005 3.30∗∗∗ 0.005 3.70∗∗∗
Fraction of land with non-black soil −0.910 −0.22 −2.328 −0.57
Physical capital Value of large animals owned (US$) 0.001 0.58 0.000 0.38
Community Years CARE in community 3.334 4.28∗∗∗ 3.243 4.17∗∗∗
charactersitics Distance to city (population >50,000) −0.204 −2.47∗∗ −0.207 −2.52∗∗
Population density (households/ha) 2.993 1.30 3.580 1.54
Annual rainfall (cm/year) 0.196 1.24 0.188 1.19
Provincial Azuay −14.851 −1.82∗ −16.119 −1.98∗∗
dummies† Canar −28.061 −3.37∗∗∗ −28.520 −3.43∗∗∗
Chimborazo 8.284 1.22 7.231 1.07
Cotopaxi −9.550 −1.22 −11.325 −1.44
Imbabura −7.089 −0.76 −6.709 −0.72
Loja −19.240 −1.92∗ −17.234 −1.71∗
Constant −66.460 −2.00∗∗ −69.524 −2.09∗∗
Notes: ∗ signiﬁcant at 10%, ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5%, ∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1% level.
† Default province is Tunguragua.
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households require male labor to invest in resource conservation and
households endowed with large amounts of female labor are less likely
to invest, or will invest more slowly, in conservation. Education was
positively and signiﬁcantly related to adoption intensity. This corresponds
to the adoption literature which notes that households with more educated
members are likely to be more receptive to new information (Feder et al.,
1985). Taken together, these results indicate that both labor constraints for
male labor and information availability are important in determining the
intensity of adoption.
Physical assets, as measured by total land owned and value of animals
owned, were not found to signiﬁcantly affect adoption. However, the
number of parcels owned by the farmer negatively impacted the intensity
of adoption suggesting certain ﬁxed costs associated with investment in
resource conservation. Neither the slope of the steepest plot a farmer
operated nor the altitude of the highest plot a farmer operated was found
to signiﬁcantly inﬂuence adoption. Surprisingly, the distance to the furthest
parcel positively inﬂuenced the intensity of adoption. The number of
years in which CARE worked with the community positively affected the
intensity of adoption. Thismeans that over timehouseholdsweremanaging
more land in a manner consistent with the PROMUSTA program and the
expectation is that resource conservation would have continued improving
after the survey was conducted. The distance to an urban center measures
access to markets and, likewise, land values. The closer the household
was to an urban center, the higher the intensity of adoption. This is most
likely because access to markets allows a higher return to alterations in
agricultural production. Correspondingly, it could be that land markets
function better near cities and therefore farmers are more able to capture
returns to investments in conservation. Populationdensity and rainfallwere
not found to inﬂuence the intensity of adoption. Regional dummies show
that there were signiﬁcant differences in adoption across some regions.
In particular, Azuay, Can˜ar, and Loja were found to have signiﬁcantly
lower intensities of adoption than Tunguragua, which can partially be
attributed to the strong emphasis on terrace adoption and natural resource
management in Tunguragua.
6. Impact assessment
Although the beneﬁciaries of PROMUSTA include non-participating
farmers and off-farm beneﬁciaries of improved resource management,
direct beneﬁts accrue to participating farmers and we focus on these
farmers in assessing the impact of PROMUSTA. PROMUSTA worked with
nearly 10,000 families in 193 communities. The beneﬁts to these farmers
are an increased value of current production and a higher value of future
production due to the sustainable management of resources. Determining
a numerical value for the beneﬁts is difﬁcult and not possible with the
available data. Instead we examine the actions households have taken and
farmers’ perceptions of the value of the project as noted in the household
survey (table 7). Of the 9,333 households participating in the PROMUSTA
program 413 were surveyed. Nine out of ten of these households adopted
some part of the PROMUSTA technological package, suggesting that at
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Table 7. Impact of PROMUSTA
Sampled Total
participant Per cent sampled participant
Economic value households households households
Number of households 413 100.0% 9333
Adoption of some practices 371 89.8% 8384
Improved income 312 75.5% 7051
Soil quality improvement 248 60.0% 5604
Activities worth the effort 353 85.5% 7977
Sampled land Per cent sampled Total
Resource management (land) area∗ land area land area∗
Area (hectares) 480 100.0% 10,847
Appropriately managed 174 36.3% 3932
With terraces 183 38.1% 4135
With control of water erosion 187 39.0% 4226
With improved water 36 7.5% 814
management
Note: ∗ Participant operated land.
the time of the survey a total of 8,384 Ecuadorian farmers in some way
altered their agricultural system as a direct result of the program.Assuming
adoption only occurredwhen therewas an anticipated beneﬁt, this suggests
more than 8,000 households beneﬁted from the PROMUSTA program.
Three-quarters of surveyed households reported improved income as a
result of program participation implying more than 7,000 households
realized short-term improvements in income. Sixty per cent of farmers
noted soil improvements indicating they perceived long-term beneﬁts of
adoption. Eighty-ﬁve per cent of participating households – 95 per cent of
those that adopted some practices – noted that the activities undertaken
were worth the effort. Therefore, nearly 8,000 of the 9,333 households
participating in the PROMUSTA program found the program valuable.
The 413 participant households that were surveyed operated 480
hectares of land. Assuming a similar level of land operation, participating
households operated in total 10,852 hectares of land. Using CARE’s criteria,
42.1 per cent of land operated by participants was managed better (at the
time of the 1996 survey). This suggests that 4,572 hectares of land were
being managed in a sustainable manner. Additionally, 4,808 hectares had
terraces, 5,019 hectares had measures that help control water erosion, and
946 hectares had improved water management (reservoirs and irrigation
systems).
The beneﬁts discussed here should be considered conservative estimates
for two reasons. First, only beneﬁts to participating households are
discussed. Presumably, non-participating households might have adopted
anumber of the practices promotedbyPROMUSTAand receivedbeneﬁts as
well. Additionally, improved resource management should reduce erosion
and limit the off-farm negative externalities. Second, as noted in both the
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probit on terracing (table 4) and the intensity of adoption regression (table 6),
adoption of conservation technologies takes time. As the households
continue to adopt these practices, more land will become managed in a
sustainable manner. These beneﬁts are yet to be felt, but the results indicate
they are likely to come.
7. Conclusions and implications for conservation programs
The results of this analysis suggest that CARE through its PROMUSTA
program was successful in promoting resource conservation in the
communities of the Ecuadorian Andes where the program operated.
PROMUSTA opportunistically selected from among a large set of available
conservation and agricultural technologies and selectively offered them
in perceived high payoff situations as a pathway for scaling up the
application of new technologies. The program led to a higher intensity
of adoption of conservation measures than would have occurred if the
program had not operated. Furthermore, the results indicate that adoption
levels were likely to have increased after the survey was conducted. While
it may not be possible to replicate this level of success in all communities
in the Ecuadorian Andes, the approach is likely to be successful in
communities with characteristics similar to PROMUSTA communities;
namely, in communities with high levels of social capital and low levels
of migration.
A key to CARE’s success was the promotion of conservation measures
in conjunction with measures that enhanced the short-term proﬁtability
of agriculture. In particular, the adoption of terraces was found to
increase signiﬁcantly when accompanied by alterations to the agricultural
system such as new crops, biological barriers, and improved agricultural
production. The implication of these results for program design is clear. An
alternative to providing subsidies or other forms of assistance to farmers
to induce conservation is to promote alterations in the agricultural system
that enhance the short-term proﬁtability of agriculture. This is likely to lead
to higher levels of adoption and to be more sustainable in that farmers
are more likely to maintain such changes. One difﬁculty in doing this is
that it requires identifying changes in the agricultural system that will
complement conservation and improve short-term proﬁtability. CARE’s
approach was to offer a diverse menu of innovations from which the
household could choose. This allowed farmers to choose a set of options
that ﬁt their particular needs and circumstances. While this appears to
be generally successful, certain households seemed in a better position
to take advantage of this system. Households that were closer to urban
centers were more likely to alter agricultural practices probably because
of their greater market access. Farmers with black soils and thus higher
agricultural potential were also more likely to adopt. These results suggest
this type of programmaybemore successful in areas near urban centers and
with fertile soils. Furthermore, developing this type of program requires
a well-organized extension system and knowledgeable extension agents
that have adequate information on agricultural potential for an area,
as well as household characteristics and constraints. The PROMUSTA
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project internalized this last caveat by providing its own extension agents
and continuously trained them in the diverse technologies they were
offering.
One area of potential concern in terms of gender equality are the
results for both plot-level terrace adoption and household-level intensity
of adoption on male and female labor availability. The results indicate that
male labor availability increases adoption while female labor availability
decreases adoption. If this is the case and adoption improves short-term
proﬁtability and long-term sustainability, this could lead to greater gender
inequality in participating communities. Since the low adoption rate seems
to be linked to terrace adoption and the need for male labor for this activity,
it may be appropriate to provide some assistance, in terms of male labor
services, to households endowed primarily with female labor.
This analysis offers some clear lessons for those designing resource
conservation projects both in Latin America and elsewhere. First, the
selection of communities and the self-selection of participants appear to
matter. Although the data was insufﬁcient to draw clear conclusions, the
level of social capital in participant communities and among participants
seems important. Second, resource conservation should not be done
in isolation and should be part of a broader attempt to transform
the agricultural system. Farmers are more likely to adopt conservation
measures as part of a transformation thatmakes agriculturemore proﬁtable.
Doing this can bedifﬁcult since it requires identifyingproﬁtable agricultural
activities that complement resource conservation. It is easier to ﬁnd such
activities if farmers have access to relatively fertile land andhave reasonable
access to markets. This suggests that programs should be targeted to areas
with this type of potential. Third, programs are more likely to be successful
if they offer a variety of options for managing resources and transforming
agriculture, are well-organized and work closely with farmers in designing
a plan to alter farm management. These were all key components of the
PROMUSTA program and appear essential to the success of the program.
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